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The Right Responsibility: Does the Right to Procreate Include the
Responsibility to Parent?
A. FELECIA Epps·
I. INTRODUCTION: MEET NELL
Nell gave birth to her first child, Joyce, in 1988.1 Nell received no
prenatal care while pregnant with Joyce.' Joyce was born with cocaine in her
system.' A social worker from Child Protective Services (CPS) reviewed the
case carefully before determining that Joyce could leave the hospital with
Nell.4 The next year, Nell had another child, Beth. 5 Like Joyce, Beth was
exposed to cocaine while in her mother's womb." Beth too was allowed to go
home with Nell after a social worker from CPS investigated the case." Nell's
third child, Crystal, was born in 1990.8 Like both of her sisters, she had been
exposed to cocaine prior to birth." Once again, following an investigation by
a CPS worker, Crystal was allowed to go home with Nell. lO In 1991, CPS
received an anonymous report that Nell was using crack cocaine and leaving
her children unattended. I I The social worker who investigated the report
found that Nell had a messy home.'? She never found Nell and the case was
closed." In 1992, Nell gave birth to Patrick. He too was born with cocaine
in his system." The social worker called to investigate the case removed
Patrick from Nell's home. 15
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6. NOBODY'S CHILDREN, supra note I, at 79.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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I\. NOBODY'S CHILDREN, supra note I, at 79.
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13. Id. at 80.
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Nell's story is becoming more common in the world of those who work
for agencies charged with protecting our children. It presents a difficult
challenge to those who want to protect the children and reunite the family.
What role the courts should play in accomplishing these objectives is still in
question. Is imposing a condition on a mother, like Nell, that she give birth
to no more children until she can care for Patrick and his siblings a legally
permissible action?
Proponents of such action might argue from a common sense standpoint
that since Nell is not capable of caring for the children she already has, she
should give birth to no more. Allowing Nell to continue to have children only
jeopardizes the welfare of all of Nell's children and places an additional
financial burden on society. Nell will never "get herself together" and be able
to care for her children until she stops having more children. But those who
would take steps to curb Nell's procreation rights will immediately encounter
a major obstacle-the right to freedom in procreation decisions.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the fundamental right to
privacy includes the right to freedom in procreation decisions." Does the
right to freedom in procreation decisions include the right to have children you
cannot or will not provide for physically, financially, and emotionally? In two
recent cases, a New York family court answered "no" to this question. Both
cases involved parents who had a history of substance abuse and child neglect
resulting in the removal of another child from their custody." Among the
conditions the court imposed as part of the plan to protect the children and
reunite them with their parents, was that the parents have no additional
children until they regained custody of those already in the care of others. 18
According to the New York Family Court, the United States Supreme Court
cases dealing with the rights of families and parents 19 support the conclusion
that the right to bring children into this world includes the corresponding
responsibility to take care of them. The decisions in New York appear to
make sense under the circumstances presented in each case. They do,
however, raise three questions. First, do Stanley v. Illinois" and other cases
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy protects a woman's
right to choose to have an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that unmarried
persons have a right to privacy in deciding whether to use birth control). See also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy includes the right of married persons to make
procreation decisions); Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (preventing involuntary sterilization
of a criminal on equal protection grounds). See infra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
17. In re Bobbijean P., No. 03626-03, 2004 WL 834480 (N. Y. Fam. Ct. Mar. 31,2004); In re V.R.,
No. 5616-04, 2004 WL 3029874 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Dec. 22, 2004).
18. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *I; In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *I.
19. See infra notes 124-191 and accompanying text.
20. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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dealing with family rights support the conclusion that the ability to care for a
child is a condition precedent to procreation? Second, what impact do cases
dealing with the right to privacy in procreation have on the issue? Finally, in
the face of Supreme Court precedent dealing with the right to privacy, is it
legally permissible for a court to impose a "no more kids" condition on
parents as part of a case plan focused on protecting the child and reuniting the
family?
This article will explore these questions. It will start by discussing the
process by which children are removed from a home due to maltreatment as
background for a discussion of the two New York cases. Next, the two cases
will be discussed and the analysis used in each case will be compared. The
history of the right to privacy as it relates to freedom in procreation decisions,
parental rights, and family rights will provide additional background. I will
demonstrate that cases dealing with the right to privacy in procreation
decisions are applicable to the "no more kids" condition, while parental right
and family rights cases miss the point. Consequently, parental and family
rights cases are not adequate support for the New York court's decisions.
This article argues that United States Supreme Court precedent in the
area ofprocreation rights should be considered when evaluating the "no more
kids" condition. Such precedent does not support the position that the
freedom to make procreation decisions is somehow conditioned on the ability
or desire to care for a child. Restrictions on the right to make procreation
decisions, like all restrictions on fundamental freedoms, are subject to strict
scrutiny. Thus, they are permissible only if they are narrowly tailored to meet
a compelling government interest and are not overly broad. Additionally, such
restrictions must be effective to accomplish the stated goal. The government
clearly has at least one compelling interest at stake in this situation-
protecting the children involved. Arguably, it has a second compelling
interest in protecting society from the dangers of parents who give birth to
children but lack the means or desire to care for them. Faced with children in
jeopardy and increasing state budgets, the state must somehow respond.
However, we must consider whether the imposition of a "no more kids"
condition is a narrowly tailored means to further those interests.
This article will argue that adding the "no more kids" condition is not
only ineffective, it is unnecessary. Consequently, the condition does not pass
the constitutional test and cannot be lawfully imposed. Instead, a carefully
developed case plan, that includes support services necessary to protect the
child and help the parent resolve their issues, is a more narrowly tailored and
more effective way to address the compelling state interests involved. Even
in situations involving parents who cannot or will not care for a child, the right
to procreate should be treated as fundamental and be entitled to constitutional
protection. To do otherwise places us on a slippery slope towards further
88 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY fA W REVIEW [Vol. 34
procreation limitations on those who are deemed by others in our society to
be unfit to procreate.
n. How THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM WORKS
The Federal government provides funding for state efforts to protect the
welfare of children. With this funding comes a requirement that states adopt
certain procedures to deal with child abuse and neglect." Although the
specific procedures for dealing with situations in which children are alleged
to be abused or neglected differ from state to state, the basics remain the
same." Abuse and neglect are both covered by the term "maltreatment?"
The term includes situations where a parent or primary caregiver causes or
allows serious harm to happen to the child." Normally the process starts with
a report of suspected child abuse or neglect to the state agency charged with
administering child protective programs." In Nell's case, the report was made
by the hospital where her children were born. Once the report is received, a
caseworker is assigned to investigate the report. The report is "screened in"
if there is enough evidence to conclude that further investigation should be
conducted or "screened out" if there is not enough evidence to suggest that
further investigation is warranted." If the Child Protective Services (CPS)
worker determines that the child is in immediate danger, they may move the
child to a shelter, foster care, the home of a relative, or another appropriate
placement." The worker may also gather information to determine what
services the family needs to help provide a safe environment for the child. In
Nell's case, each worker concluded after a brief investigation that each child,
except Patrick, should not be removed from her custody. 28
Following removal of a child from the home, an initial hearing is held.
The court determines whether a temporary order should be entered." This
order may temporarily place the child in foster care, mandate other services
for the family or child, or even forbid contact pending an adjudication
hearing." At the adjudication hearing, the court determines whether any
21. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (2007).
22. See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY. How DoES THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
WORK? (2006),available at hnp:/Iwww.childwelfare.gov/pubslfactsheets/cpswork.pdf [hereinafter CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM].
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. [d.
26. [d.
27. CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 22.
28. [d.
29. [d.
30. [d.
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maltreatment occurred and whether the child should be under the continuing
jurisdiction of the court." If the court determines that the child has been
subject to maltreatment, it moves on to the disposition phase of the process."
Disposition may happen directly after adjudication or may take place
sometime later. During this phase, the court may order the parent to obtain
certain services in order to ameliorate the maltreatment.33 The order entered
by the court may include a visitation schedule. It may also specify services to
be provided to the child and family, and it may detail the agency's obligation
to assist the family." A key part of disposition is a case plan proposed by
CPS. The case plan provides the steps that will be taken to ensure the child's
safety, lists the services the state will provide to protect the child and help
reunite the family, and sets out the steps the parent must go through to regain
custody ofthe child." The plan may include requirements for substance abuse
treatment, parenting classes, employment, and housing." If the plan is
approved by the court, it becomes a part of the court's order. 37 The status of
a child in foster care must be reviewed every six months to make sure that the
child is safe and that the placement is appropriate and necessary. 38 During the
review, the court or administrative liaison also evaluates the extent of
compliance with the case plan, the progress towards alleviating the causes
necessitating placement in foster care, and when the child can be returned to
the home or placed for adoption."
Federal law requires that a "permanency hearing" take place within
twelve months after the child enters foster care." At this hearing, CPS is
required to present a "permanency plan" for the child41• The plan addresses
where the child will live after foster care. Usually, the goal of the plan is to
reunite the child with the parent." The goal may however be adoption,
31. Id.
32. CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 22.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 42 U.S.c. § 675(1) (2007). See also CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 22.
36. Id.
37. Id. See also In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *3, and In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874,
at *11-13 for examples of court orders approving case plans.
38. CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM, supra note 22.
39. 42 U.S.c. § 675(5)(B) (2007).
40. Id. § 675(5)(C).
41. Id.
42. Id. § 671(a)(15)(B). In most cases, the state must make reasonable efforts to preserve and
reunify the family. The case plan must provide that reasonable efforts be made to preserve and reunify
families. This includes efforts to avoid removing the child from the family and efforts to make it possible
for the child to return home.
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custody by a relative, or transition to independent living". Once the plan is
approved by the court, it must be reviewed every twelve months thereafter."
The parent must be able to provide a suitable home for the child within fifteen
months of placement in foster care or she risks having her parental rights
terminated."
A. Georgia Procedures
The procedures followed by Georgiajuvenile courts provide an example
of how the process works in a typical state. In Georgia, the agency charged
with providing child protective services is the Department of Family and
Children Services (DFCS) within the Department of Human Resources. A
DFCS worker may remove a child from his or her home if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the child is suffering from illness or injury, the child
is in immediate danger, or removal is necessary to protect the child.46 The
child is then placed in a foster home or another home approved by the court.
Placement may also be in a shelter, hospital, or with a relative."
A detention hearing must take place within seventy-two hours of the time
a child is removed from his or her home due to maltreatment." The parent or
guardian is entitled to reasonable notice of the time, place, and purpose of the
hearing." At this hearing the court determines whether it is more likely than
not that the child is deprived due to maltreatment. The child will be released
to either his or her parents or guardian, or the child will be detained. 50 The
child will be detained if detention is necessary to protect the child, to prevent
the child from being removed from the jurisdiction, or to provide for the
child's care until there is a full hearing." Within five days of the detention
hearing, a petition alleging that the child has been abused or neglected must
be filed." If the child is removed from the home at the detention hearing, an
adjudication hearing must occur within ten days. If the child remains in the
home, the adjudication hearing must take place within sixty days of the
detention hearing. 53 At the adjudication hearing the court determines whether
43. [d.
44. 42 U.S.c. § 675(5)(C) (2007).
45. [d. § 675(5)(E). If a child is in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months,
absent certain special situations, the state must petition for a termination of parental rights.
46. GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11-45(a)(4) (2007).
47. [d. § 15-11-48 (f).
48. [d. § 15-11-49 (c)(3).
49. [d. § 15-11-49 (c)(4).
50. [d. § 15-11-49 (d).
51. GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11-46 (2007).
52. [d. at § 15-11-49 (e)(2007).
53. [d. at § 15-11-39 (a)(2007).
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there is clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that a child is
deprived." The focus is on present conditions, not past circumstances or
potential future deprivation. The court has broad discretion in making this
determination. If the court determines that the child is deprived, a disposition
hearing must take place to determine the steps that should be taken to improve
the situation for the child and the family." The court may proceed
immediately with disposition or postpone disposition for a later hearing."
DFCS must develop a case plan within thirty days of the child being
removed from the home. The plan is reviewed each time the court reviews the
disposition order." The plan must be best suited to the protection and
physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child". In most cases, reasonable
efforts must be made to reunite the family. 59 The court may approve,
disapprove or recommend modification of the plan. Once the court approves
the plan, it becomes part of a court order." The plan must be reviewed ninety
days after disposition and every six months thereafter. The court's order
expires twelve months after removal."
If the plan proposes that the family not be reunited" a permanency
hearing must be held within thirty days of the time DFCS submits the plan."
In every case DFCS must submit a permanency plan and there must be a
permanency hearing for every child within one year of the date the child enters
foster care". The permanency plan must be reviewed every twelve months
during the time the child remains in DFCS custody." If a child has been in
foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, DFCS must
petition the court to terminate the parental rights of the parents so that a
permanent placement can be found for the child." The Georgia procedure
follows the mandates of Federal law.
B. Foster Care and Child Maltreatment Statistics
Information available from the Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and
Reporting System (AFCARS) indicates that as of September 30,2005 there
54. Id. at § 15-11-54 (a)(2007).
55. Id. § 15-11-55 (a).
56. GA.CODE ANN. §15-11-54 (c)(2007).
57. Id. § 15-11-58 (b).
58. Id. § 15-11-58 (a)(I).
59. /d. § IS-II-58 (a)(2).
60. Id. § 15-11-58(c).
61. GA.CODE ANN. § 15-11-58(k)(2007).
62. Id. § 15-11-58(0)(1).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 15-11-58(m).
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were 513,000 children in foster care." The majority of these children had
been in foster care for seventeen months or less." Most lived in foster care
homes." The goal for 51% of these children was reunification with their
parent or principal caretaker." Approximately 311,000 children entered foster
care during fiscal year 200570 and 287,000 left foster care in 2005.71 Of those
leaving foster care, 54% were reunified with their parent or principal
caretaker." Most had been in foster care for less than seventeen months."
The National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDIS) was
created in 1988 in order to establish a system to collect and analyze data
relating to child maltreatment and to publish an annual report on child
maltreatment. According to its most recent report, during 2004 there were
approximately 3 million referrals to child protection agencies of suspected
child abuse or neglect, involving 5.5 million children." Of this number,
62.7% of the referrals were screened in and 37.3% were screened out.75 Based
on the number of referrals screened in, 60.7% were found to be
unsubstantiated after investigation." The cases of 3,503,000 children were
investigated and 872,000 of those children were determined to be victims of
abuse or neglect." The majority were victims of neglect." A small
percentage of these child victims (14.5%) were also categorized as victims of
66. The most recent statistics available are for 2004. They can be found in U.S. DEP'ToFHEALrn
AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES,
CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THEAFCARSREPoRT-PRELIMINARY EsTIMATES FOR FY 2005(2006),available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programslcb/stats_research/afcarsltar/reportI3.pdf [hereinafter AFCARS
REPORT].
67. [d. at I. Five percent had been in foster care less than one month; 20% for one to five months;
17% for six to eleven months; and 12% for twelve to seventeen months. [d.
68. [d. Twenty-fourpercent lived in a foster family home with a relative and 46% lived in a foster
family home of with a non-relative. [d.
69. AFCARSREPORT, supra note 66, at 2. The goal for 20% of these children was adoption. [d.
70. [d.
71. [d.
72. [d. at 4. Fifty-four were reunified, II % were living with a relative, and 18% were adopted.
AFCARS REPORT, supra note 66, at 4.
73. [d. Seventeen percent had been in foster care for less than one month, 16% for one to five
months, 17% for six to eleven months, and 13% for twelve to seventeen months. [d.
74. U.S. DEP'TOF HEALrn AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON
CHILDREN, YOUTHANDFAM1LIES, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT20047 (2006),available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/prograrnslcb/pubslcm04/cm04.pdf[hereinafterCHILD MALTREATMENT 2004].
75. [d.
76. [d. at 10.
77. [d. at 23.
78. [d. at 24 (62.4% experienced neglect).
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other types of maltreatment, including congenital drug addiction." Most of
the child victims had no history of prior victimization."
The report also addresses the rate of recurrence of maltreatment. In
42.2% of the states reporting, 6.1% or fewer of the children who were victims
of abuse or neglect during the first six months of the period under review had
another substantiated or indicated report within six months." This was an
increase from 29.4% of states reporting in 2000.82 The recurrence statistics
indicate that prior victims are 84% more likely to be victimized multiple
times.f Maltreatment of children while in foster care is another important
concern. The percentage of children subjected to substantiated or indicated
abuse by a foster parent or facility staff was 57% or less in 84.2% of the states
providing data." This was an improvement from 57.1% of states reporting in
2000.85 It is estimated that the federal government spent approximately $5
billion on foster care during fiscal year 2006.86
The goal in taking a child from the parent is first and foremost to protect
the child. The secondary goal is to allow the parent to get his or her life in
order and ultimately to be reunited with the child. If the parent is successful
and regains custody, there is a possibility that the child will be victimized by
the same parent again. If the parent is not successful in remedying the
problem that caused the child to be removed in the first place, the child can be
placed for adoption within twenty-two months. Despite this time limit, many
children remain in foster homes for long periods of time, in some cases
suffering further abuse and neglect, and sometimes being passed from home
to horne."
m. Do NOT HAVE CHILDREN UNTIL You CAN PARENT THEM
This is in essence what the Family Court of Monroe County, New York
said to parents who lost custody of children due to neglect in the two cases
mentioned previously. In each case the court decided, as part of a disposition
order to impose a condition on the parents that they have no additional
children while subject to the court's jurisdiction. The first case involved an
79. CHIlDMALTREATMENT 2004, supra note 74 at 24. This number would include children like
Bobbijean and V.R.,discussed infra notes 62-101 and accompanying text.
80. CHIlDMALTREATMENT 2004, supra note 74, at 24 (74.3% had no history of victimization).
81. Id. at 27.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 28.
84. Id.
85. CHIlDMALTREATMENT 2004, supra note 74, at 28.
86. U.S. DEP'TOFHEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHIlDREN ANDFAMlLIES,PAYMENTS
TO STATES FOR FOSTER CARE AND ADoPTION AssISfANCE 274 (2007).
87. NOBODY'S CHIlDREN, supra note I at 81-86 (discussing problems in the foster care system).
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infant, Bobbijean, who was removed from her mother Stephanie's custody
shortly after her birth." Due to the presence ofcocaine in Bobbijean's system
at birth, she was not even allowed to leave the hospital with Stephanie."
A. In re Bobbijean
Stephanie was not new to the child welfare system. Her other three
children were previously removed from her custody by DHHS as a result of
neglect proceedings." Both Stephanie and Rodney, Bobbijean's father, were
drug addicts." Stephanie appeared in court at only one of the court
proceedings dealing with Bobbijean." Rodney never appeared."
At trial, the DHHS caseworker testified about the facts surrounding
Bobbijean's removal as well as the facts surrounding the removal of the other
children." Both parents had serious drug problems and had failed to comply
with court orders relating to their other children." These orders required that
the parents obtain mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and
parenting classes." Neither parent showed up at the trial so the caseworker's
testimony was not rebutted." The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Bobbijean had been neglected by her parents and was in
imminent physical danger." It based this conclusion on several facts. First,
despite being ordered to obtain certain services as part of prior neglect
proceedings, the parents failed to act." In addition, they failed to attend
meetings scheduled with DHHS workers. tOO The mother neglected her
88. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480.
89. Id. at *1.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *2.
92. ld. at *I.
93. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *2. Under New York law, family courts have the authority to order that the parents take
various steps including to "cooperate in obtaining and accepting medical treatment, psychiatric diagnosis
and treatment, alcoholism and drug abuse treatment, employment or counseling services, or child
guidance." N.Y. CT. RULES § 205.83(a)(5) (McKinney 2005). A court may also order the parent to "do
or refrain from doing any other specified act of omission or commission that, in the judgment of the court
is necessary to protect the child from injury or mistreatment, and to help safeguard the physical, mental and
emotional well-being of the child." Id. § 205.83(b)(5). The court referred to this provision in support of
its decision to impose the "no more kids" condition. This provision gives the court authority to order and
enforce other conditions as well.
97. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *2.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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responsibilities to Bobbijean by testing positive for cocaine during her
pregnancy and at the time Bobbijean was born.'?' Finally, both parents had
continuing drug abuse problems. 102
The court took the unusual step of ordering as part of the disposition plan
that Bobbijean' s parents have no more children until all of their children were
being raised by a natural parent and no longer cared for at the public's
expense.'?' The court described its action as requiring Bobbijean's parents "to
act like responsible parents and ...have no more children unless they could
parent them.?'?' The court noted that Bobbijean was motherless and
fatherless-in essence born into a "no parent" family. 105 The court expressed
doubt that Stephanie should become pregnant again. 106 The Court opined that
"babies deserve more than to be born to parents who have proven that they
cannot possibly raise or parent a child."!"
The court rejected the argument that the right to privacy includes the
right to have an unlimited number of children. 108 It cited Griswold v.
Connecticutl'" Roe v. Wade,llo and Lawrence v. Texas l l l as the possible
source of such a right. I 12 The court moved on, however, to note that another
case, Stanley v. Illinoisi" impliedly rejects the idea that there is a right to
have an unlimited number of children. I 14 The court gleaned from the holding
in Stanley that it is not the right to conceive a child that is protected but rather
the right to conceive and raise a child.!" Next, the court cited several
Supreme Court cases that emphasized the "precious" nature offamily rights. I 16
Based on these cases, it concluded that "there is absolutely nothing precious
about giving birth to repeated children, only to immediately require friends,
101. Id.
102. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *2.
103. Id at *3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *4.
106. Id.
107. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *4.
108. Id.
109. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy includes the right of married persons to
make procreation decisions). See infra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
110. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy protects a woman's right to choose to
have an abortion). See infra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
III. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the right to privacy protects the right of adults to engage in
private consensual sexual relationships). See infra notes 214-224 and accompanying text.
112. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *4.
113. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
114. Id.
liS. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *4.
116. Id.
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relatives, or strangers, as well as society as a whole, to raise those children at
its expense."!'?
The court continued its analysis by balancing the right of the individual
against the right of the child to be protected and the rights of society not to be
saddled with the physical and financial burden of caring for the child.!" It
went on to discuss the current foster care burden to illustrate the financial cost
of caring for children born into "no parent" families.!'" The ultimate goal of
the disposition plan was to help the parents become adequate.!" This goal
would be more difficult to achieve, the court reasoned, if the parents were
allowed to have additional children.'?' The court declined to specify what
steps the parents should take to avoid having another child.!" It noted that
there are many methods of birth control, including sterilization, available to
the parents.!" If they chose sterilization, it would be available at no cost. 124
The court was careful to specify that is was not encouraging the mother to get
an abortion if she got pregnant.!" It ended its decision by stating that "[tjhe
generosity and kindness of society has been abused enough . . . existing
children have been neglected enough, and this court will do all it can to end
this pattern of behavior."!" A few months later, in a similar case, In re
V.R.,127 the court expanded upon the analysis it had begun in Bobbijean.P"
B. In re V.R.
V.R.'s mother, I.W., was a homeless, unemployed, drug abuser and
prostitute. 129 She had given birth to seven children by seven different
fathers."? All of J.W.' s children had been removed from her custody. 131 V.R.,
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *5. The court discussed the details of the county foster care budget. It noted that the most
recent county foster care budget was $32 million. In 2001, the average cost ofOSS family foster care per
child per year was $22,931; "purchased family care" was $27,753; "residential care" was $84,013. In re
Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *5.
120. Id. at *6.
121. Id.
122. Id at *5.
123. Id.
124. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *6.
125. Id.
126. ld. (footnote omitted).
127. 2004 WL 3029874 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Dec. 22, 2004).
128. See, e.g., id.
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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the youngest child, was born with cocaine in her system.'? She was removed
fromJ.W.'s custody when J.W.left the hospital. 133 Although J.W. was given
visitation rights, she never visited V.R. 134 At the disposition hearing, the court
notified the parties of its intent to impose a special condition that must be met
by J.W. if she was to regain custody of V.R.135 She was to conceive no more
children while subject to the court's jurisdiction until she reclaimed all of her
children from foster care and other caretakers.!" J.W. objected to the
condition and requested time to submit an argument in opposition.!" DHHS
presented a case plan with the stated permanency goal of reunification as
required under New York law.138
J.W. did not attend the final hearing."? As in Bobbijean, the case
worker's testimony was not rebutted."? The case worker testified to prior
referrals. 141 Although J.W. had been ordered to participate in substance abuse
treatment, mental health counseling, and parenting services, she had not
cooperated with DHHS efforts to provide her those services.!" The court
found that J.W. had completed none of the programs ordered by the court and
that V.R.' s health and safety were at imminent risk.143 In addition, the court
found that J.W. had neglected her responsibility to V.R. by testing positive for
cocaine during her pregnancy and causing V.R. to be born with cocaine in her
system.':" The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that J.W. had
neglected J.R. 145 Next, the court discussed provisions in New York law
regarding dispositional orders that allowed the court to impose various
conditions that a parent must meet in order to reclaim his or her child from
foster care.!" Under state law, it could require that J.W. cooperate with the
supervising agency in remedying specified acts or omissions found to have
132. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *1.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *1 n.7.
135. Id at *2.
136. Id.
137. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *2.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *3.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *4.
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caused the neglect."? It could also order J.W. to do or not do certain things
that the court deemed necessary to protect the child. 148
As it had done in Bobbijean, the court emphasized the United States
Supreme Court cases that focused on the fundamental nature of family
rights. 149 It stressed that the constitutional rights involving parents and
children are about relationships. 150 Although there is a right to family
integrity, there is not a right to give birth to children who must be raised by
society and the welfare system. 151 According to the court, to do so was
equivalent to a crime--endangering the welfare of a child. 152 The sole focus
should not be on the reproductive freedom of the parent to the exclusion of the
rights of a child who has already been born. The court found no law
promoting as "precious," the right of parents to have babies without the
responsibility of raising them. 153
In V.R., unlike Bobbijean, when the court turned to the constitutional
right to privacy, it actually addressed the issue and attempted to demonstrate
how imposition of the "no more kids" condition met the strict scrutiny
standard.l" It considered the specific facts of the case.!" First, J.W. had a
neglect case pending for V.R. and her other children were already in foster
care.P" Second, J.W. was not able to care for V.R. physically or financially
for the reasonably foreseeable future.'? In this situation a "no more kids"
order was a legitimate means to meet the state's interests.!" The state's
objective was to protect children and avoid the additional physical, social,
emotional, and financial burden placed on the state by parents unable to care
for their children.!" The "no more kids" order avoided irreparable harm to
children who had yet to be conceived as well as to V.R. 160 The condition
would also aid J.W. in getting her life under control so that she could get V.R.
and her siblings back from state custody."! The court concluded that the
order was not overly broad because it was not a permanent restriction on
147. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *4.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *5.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *8.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *8.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *9.
161. Id.
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J.W.'s right to have children.!" J.W. would be able to have more children
once she regained custody ofV.R. and V.R's siblings or if shewas no longer
under court supervision. 163
C. Legal Analysis: Bobbijean and V.R.
The Family Court ofMonroe County, New York did not have clear legal
support for its decision to impose a "no more kids" condition as part of its
orders. The court looked to United States Supreme Court precedent dealing
with family rights in support of its conclusions. The cases it relied upon
provide tangential support at best. Familial integrity rights, like the right to
freedom in procreation decisions, are part of the right to privacy. However,
the right to freedom in procreation decisions exists apart from the family
rights on which the court focused. In both V.R. and Bobbijean, the court relied
on Stanley v. Illinoisr" and included a quote from Stanley referencing several
other prominent Supreme Court cases in the area of family rights. 165 Neither
Stanley, nor the cases cited in Stanley, clearly support the court's decisions to
impose such a condition. !66
The court in Bobbijean and V.R. gave little consideration to cases such
as Griswold v. Connecticur" that are at the heart of the matter. In V.R., the
court cited Carey v. Population Servicest" and Roe v. Wade!69 in support of
the assertion that the right to privacy relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education is not
absolute."? Although May v. Anderson'?' had nothing to do with the right to
freedom in procreation decisions, 172the New York court seized upon language
in May describing as precious the right of parents to custody of their children
162. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *9.
163. Id.
164. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
165. In re Bobbijean, 2004 WL 834480, at *4; In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *6. See infra notes
155-187 and accompanying text for a discussion of Stanley and other cases dealing with the rights of unwed
fathers.
166. See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
167. 381 U.S. 471 (1965) (holding that marital privacy includes decisions regarding birth control).
168. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding that a law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to those under
sixteen and allowing only a pharmacist to distribute them to those over sixteen violated the constitutionally
protected right to privacy).
169. 410 U.S. 113, (I973)(holding that the rightto privacy includes a woman's right to chose to have
an abortion).
170. In re V.R., 2004 W.L. 3029874, at *5.
171. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
172. Id. at 533. This case dealt with whether a state where the mother was not domiciled had
sufficient personal jurisdiction over her to cut off her right to custody of her children. Her right to conceive
a child was not at issue.
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explaining that "[t]his court knows of no case law promoting as 'precious' the
right of parents to conceive and give birth to babies with no possibility of the
parent fulfilling the corollary responsibility to care for and nurture them."!"
The court also cited various New York cases in support of its holdings. 174
Again, the cases cited do not clearly support the conclusions reached by the
court.!" In Bennett v. JeffreysF" a fifteen-year-old girl's parents voluntarily
gave her child to an older friend of the family. I77 At age twenty-three, when
the mother was better equipped to raise her child, she sought to regain
custody.!" The issue presented in the case was whether the mother could be
deprived of custody of her child solely because of the long separation.!" In
addressing this issue the court stated that, "[t]he parent has the right to rear its
child, and the child has a 'right' to be reared by its parent.,,180 The court noted
that there were exceptions to this general rule including surrender,
abandonment, persistent neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary
disruption ofcustody for a prolonged time."! The court in Bennett ultimately
reversed a lower court decision giving custody of the child to the mother and
remanded the case to the lower court for consideration of what was in the
child's best interest.!" Although the case provides some support for the
notion that the child involved has an interest in these cases, it is a bit of a
stretch to say that this interest supports the imposition of a "no more kids"
condition on the parent.
Another New York case, In re Guardianship of Jones v. Cardinal
McCloskey Children & Family ServicesP" involved a dispute over whether
DHHS had established the need for a mother to be referred to family planning
counseling.!" The mother involved had given birth to four children in four
years.!" Two of the children had been given up for adoption and another was
in foster care. 186 The court held that these facts were sufficient to establish the
173. In In re V.R., 2004 W.L. 3029874, at *5.
174. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *3; In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *1,*5.
175. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *3; In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *1,*5.
176. 40 N.Y.2d 543 (App. Ct. 1976).
177. Id. at 544.
178. Id. at 545.
179. Id. at 544.
180. Id at 546.
181. Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 546.
182. Id. at 551.
183. 503 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. App. 1986) (cited in In re V.R., 2004 WL 302984, at *5, and In re
Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *3).
184. [d. at 391.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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mother's need for family planning counseling."? Once again, this case
presented a different issue from the one presented by Bobbijean and V.R. The
resolution in Jones suggests that the proper solution in such situations is to
require that the parent seek family planning counseling. 188
The court in V.R. cited a case which holds that a biological father's
connection to his child was insufficient in and of itself to create a protected
interest in the child.!" This conclusion does not mean that the father had no
right to create the child in the first place. The V.R. Court also cited a series
of cases holding that children have certain protected rights in the legal
system."? Not included in the group ofcases the court discussed was any case
holding that a child has the right to be raised by his or her natural parents. 191
In addition, neither group of cases provides a clear answer to the question
before the court. This leaves the ultimate question-the question that is
187. See id.
188. Indeed, the court in Bobbijean acknowledges the need for family planning counseling in that
case stating: "As with Jones the facts of this case and the reality of parenthood cry out for family planning
education." In the court's opinion, however, counseling was not enough. It continues stating "this court
has gone one step further, by adding the practical condition prohibiting the respondents from conceiving
more children." In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *4.
189. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *6. The case cited Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
and other cases dealing with the rights of unwed fathers, as discussed below. See infra notes 155-187 and
accompanying text.
190. In re Y.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *7. The court cites Application ofGault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966)
(holding that juvenile delinquency proceedings must meet procedural due process requirements including
notice of the charges, notice of the right to an attorney, and notice of the right to remain silent), In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires that the burden of proof in juvenile
proceedings in which the juvenile is charged with an adult offense be beyond a reasonable doubt), Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that the first amendment protects
the rights of high school and junior high public school students to wear black arm bands to protest the war
in Vietnam), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (holding that students must be provided the minimal
procedural due process safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard when suspended from school for
ten days).
191. The issue of whether a child has the right to be raised by its natural parents has not been dealt
with directly by the United States Supreme Court. At least one scholar is of the opinion that the Court has
acknowledged a preservationist approach to children's rights. A preservationist view focuses on preserving
the family. This view is drawn in part from Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), in which the Court,
when dealing with a challenge to the termination of parental rights, stated that "the child and his parents
share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship." Id. at 760. See
Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REv. 637, 649 (2006).
This may mean that the child has a right to be with his biological parent. It may also mean that
this right ends when the welfare and safety of the child is at issue. As the welfare of both Bobbijean and
V.R. was in jeopardy, neither one had the right to remain with their biological parents. See also Bennett,
40 N.Y.2d at 546, where the court states "[t]he parent has a 'right' to rear its child, and the child has a
'right' to be reared by its parent. However, there are exceptions created by extraordinary circumstances,
illustratively, surrender, abandonment, persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary
disruption of custody over an extended period of time." Id. at 546.
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actually in front of the court-unanswered. This question is whether the
ability or desire to parent a child is a condition precedent to the right to
procreate.
The cases the court used to support its decision to impose the "no more
kids" condition are discussed below along with other cases addressing issues
raised by the court. A Supreme Court of Wisconsin case cited in V.R. strongly
supports the conclusion that a parent who intentionally fails to financially
support his or her children can be temporarily restricted from having
additional children. 192
Careful consideration of the facts and analysis used by the United States
Supreme Court in the cases it has decided reveals that precedent does not
provide a clear answer to the question of whether the right to procreate is
conditioned on the ability to care for a child.
D. Right to Privacy in Family Relations
The court in Bobbijean and V.R. indicated that the rights protected by the
Constitution are family rights which arise from some type of familial
relationship. The Supreme Court has long recognized that families have
certain liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These interests include the basic rights parents have to custody
and control of their children. The cases discussed below provide a basic
outline of the Court's approach to situations in which state law comes into
conflict with parental control of children. These cases highlight the special
rights accorded to parents with respect to their children. None of these cases
address the right of a person to become a parent in the first place.
Meyer v. Nebraskal'" one of the first cases to deal with parents' rights,
was a challenge to the Nebraska legislature's attempt to combat the "baneful
effects of permitting foreigners, who had taken up residency in this country,
to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land."'?' The
legislature enacted a law that prohibited teaching languages other than English
to children who had not graduated from eighth grade. 195 In Meyer, a teacher
charged with violating the law challenged it arguing that the law violated his
right to pursue his chosen occupation.I" The Court agreed, holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to marry, establish a home, and
192. In re V.R., 2004 WL3029874, at *9 (citing Wisconsin v, Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001),
cen. den., 537 U.S. 813 (2002». See infra notes 240-248 and accompanying text.
193. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
194. Id. at 397-98.
195. Id. at 397
196. Id.
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raise children."? Although the state's desire to create a homogeneous people
was legitimate, the means it chose exceeded the limits of state power and
conflicted with parents' rights to control the education of their own
children. 198
A few years later in Pierce v. Society ofthe Sisters ofthe Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary, 199 two private schools challenged the constitutionality of an
Oregon law that required children to attend public schools until age slxteen.P"
Under the law, students could not lawfully attend private schools and parents
faced criminal prosecution if they failed to send their children to public
schools.?" Consequently, the private schools faced declining enrollment.i"
The Court held that this law "unreasonably interfere[ed] with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.,,203 The Court concluded that the state had no general power to
standardize children's learning experience by forcing public school education.
Parents have the right, coupled with the high duty, to direct the destiny of
children and to prepare them for additional obligations.P'
Although the parent did not ultimately prevail in Prince v.
MassachusettsP" the Court once again acknowledged the special significance
of parents' rights to control the upbringing of their children.i" In that case,
a mother who allowed her daughter to distribute Jehovah Witness literature
challenged a Massachusetts' law that prohibited girls under eighteen from
selling items on the street.f" Among other objections she claimed this law
unlawfully interfered with her parental rights.?" Even though the Court
upheld the law, it also stated: "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody ... and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.,,209 The Court acknowledged that there is a private realm offarnily life
which the state cannot lawfully enter.l'?
197. [d. a1399.
198. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
199. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
200. [d. a1530.
201.
202. [d. at 532.
203. [d. at 397.
204. [d. at 535.
205. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
206. /d. at 166.
207. [d. at 160-161.
208. [d. at 164.
209. [d. at 166.
210. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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Amish parents in Wisconsin v. Yoder'" refused to comply with a state
law requiring their children to attend school until age sixteen.?" The parents
desired to educate their children consistent with Amish beliefs.i" They
believed that high school attendance was contrary to the Amish religion and
would jeopardize their children's salvation?" In its decision, the Court again
acknowledged the high value our society places on parental direction of
religious upbringing and the education of one's children during their formative
years.?" In this case, the state's interest was not totally free from a balancing
process because the state impinged on fundamental rights and interests.i" The
rights at issue were those protected by the Free Exercise Clause and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children."? The Court ruled in favor of the Amish parents.?"
The right of family members to live together was at issue in Moore v.
City ofEast Cleveland/'" Mrs. Moore lived with her son Dale and her two
grandsons, Dale Jr. and John Jr.22O The two grandsons were first cousins.P'
A city ordinance defined "family" and provided that only those included
within the definition could lawfully live together.?" Under the ordinance,
John Jr. was an illegal resident of his grandmother's house.F' Mrs. Moore
challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.P' In dealing with the
challenge, the Court reiterated that the Due Process Clause protects freedom
of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life.225 The Court
concluded that the individual liberty interests involved had to be balanced
against the demands of organized society.f" In this balancing process,
211. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
212. [d. at 207.
213. [d. at 209.
214. [d.
215. [d. at 233.
216. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
217. [d. at 235.
218. [d. at 236.
219. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
220. [d. at 498.
221. [d.
222. The ordinance provided that "a family may include not more than one dependant married or
unmarried child of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of the nominal head of the household
and the spouse and dependant children of such dependant child." [d. at 496 n.2. Consequently, Dale Sr.
and Dale Jr. were lawful residents of Mrs. Moore's home because Dale Sr. was Mrs. Moore's dependant
child and Dale Jr. was Dale Sr.'s dependant child. John however, as a Mrs. Moore's grandchild by another
of her children, did not fall within the definition of "family" provided by the ordinance. [d. at 497.
223. Moore, 431 U.S. at 497.
224. [d. at 497-98.
225. [d. at 499.
226. [d. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting».
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tradition was a factor and any sound decision was likely to be consistent with
tradition.f" The Court noted that the family is deeply rooted in the nation's
history and traditions and thus the sanctity of the family must receive
constitutional prorection.i" The family traditionally includes uncles, aunts,
cousins, and grandparents living togetber.F' The Court concluded that the
ordinance chipped away at the definition of a family by limiting which
relatives could live together.P? Consequently, the Constitution prevented East
Cleveland from forcing individuals to live in certain defined family panerns.?"
In Moore, the Court extended constitutional protection to the choice of family
members who could live together.F"
In Troxel v. Granville, 233 grandparents sought visitation rights with their
grandchildren. The children's father (the grandparents' son) was deceased.P"
The children's mother was married and desired to limit the grandparents'
visitation rights.i" A Washington trial court granted the grandparents
extensive visitation rights with the children concluding that visitation with
their grandparents was in the children's best interest.i" A state statute
allowed third parties to be granted visitation if the court concluded that
visitation was in the best interest of the child regardless of the parent's
wishes.i" In evaluating the statute, the Court noted that the rights of parents
"in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Court.,,238 In light of the
extensive precedent regarding parental rights, it was clear to the Court that the
Due Process Clause protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.P? The
Court held that it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to allow a
court to decide what is in the best interest of the child at the request of any
third party, and in spite of and in opposition to the wishes of a fit parent.i"
The cases discussed above involved parental rights to control the destiny
of their children. Parents clearly have a fundamental right to determine what
227. Id. at 503.
228. Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
229. [d.
230. [d. at 506.
231. [d.
232. [d. at 501.
233. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
234. [d. at 60.
235. [d. at 60-61.
236. [d. at 61-62.
237. [d. at 61.
238. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
239. Id. at 72.
240. Id. at 72-73.
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type of education their children will receive, to have custody of their children,
and to decide about family living arrangements. The Court has concluded that
these rights are fundamental because they are rooted in the customs and
traditions of our country. In one sense these cases could answer the question
being considered. The right to have a child you have no desire or ability to
care for is not rooted in the traditions of our society. On the other hand, these
cases do not directly address whether a parent has the right to create the child
in the first place. Cases dealing with the parental rights of unwed fathers
come closer to providing an answer than cases discussed thus far. The V.R.
and Bobbijean court suggests that these cases, particularly Stanley v.
Illinoisr" support the "no more kids" condition.
E. Parental Rights ofUnwed Fathers
The Court has grappled with the nature of unwed fathers' rights to
children born out of wedlock. These cases are helpful because of the Court's
consistent return to the conclusion that the father's right to involvement in the
child's life is conditioned on the nature of his relationship with the child prior
to his attempt to assert the right to be involved. Stanley was the first of
several cases in which unwed fathers challenged actions that affected their
right of access to their children.i"
Peter and Joan Stanley lived together on and off for eighteen years and
had three children.i" They never married.i" Peter lived with the children all
their lives and supported them financially.i" When Joan died, the State of
lllinois took custody of the children without a hearing and without any
showing that Peter was an unfit parent.i" Under lllinois law, as an unwed
father, Peter had no right to a hearing before the children could be removed
from his custody.i" Unwed mothers, married persons, and divorced persons
were entitled to such a hearing.i" Peter asserted that this procedure violated
his right to equal protection under the law. 249 The State argued that it was
legally permissible for an unwed father to be presumed to be an unfit parent.F?
241. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
242. [d. at 647.
243. [d. at 646.
244. [d.
245. [d.
246. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
247. [d. at 647.
248. [d. at 646.
249. [d. at 647.
250. [d.
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The Court considered whether Peter was entitled to a hearing, like any
other parent would receive, when the state challenged his right to custody of
his children.i" In reaching a decision,
the Court reviewed cases in which it had emphasized the importance of
"family integrity."252 It cited Meyer v. Nebraska and Prince v. Massachusetts
as cases supporting the rights to conceive and to raise one's children.i" In
Stanley, the Court held that due process required that the father be entitled to
a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken away.254
It concluded that denying Mr. Stanley a hearing while extending it to all other
parents was a denial of equal protection.i" The Court rejected the argument
that convenience to the state was enough to justify destruction of a family.f"
Quilloin v. Walcotf57 involved an unwed father, Quilloin, who tried to
prevent the child's stepfather, Walcott, from adopting the child.i" Under
Georgia law, in order to have standing to prevent his biological child from
being adopted, an unwed father had to go through a formal court procedure to
legitimate the child.i" Until the legitimation was official, the child's mother
had sole authority to make decisions regarding the child.260 This authority
included the right to veto an adoption.i"
The child was born in 1964.262 Quilloin and Mrs. Walcott, the child's
mother, never married or lived together.i'" The Walcotts married in 1967 and
in 1976, with Mrs. Walcott's consent, Mr. Walcott petitioned for adoption.i'"
In response to the adoption petition, Quilloin petitioned the court for legitima-
tion of the child and for visitation rights.i" The trial court consolidated the
petitions and allowed Quilloin to be heard on all issues.t" The trial court
found that Quilloin gave the child gifts, visited on many special occasions, and
251. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
252. [d. at 658.
253. [d. at 651. "The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essentialj.]" [d.
254. [d. at 658.
255. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
256. [d. at 657.
257. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
258. [d. at 247.
259. [d. at 249.
260. [d.
261. [d. at 248.
262. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247.
263. [d.
264. [d.
265. [d. at 249-250.
266. [d. at 250.
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provided financial support irregularly.267 Ultimately, the court concluded that
legitimation and visitation were not in the child's best interest and that step-
parent adoption was in the child's best interest.i" The adoption was
granted.i" Quilloin appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that he, like the
biological mother, should have the right to veto the adoption.F" Failure to
give him this right, he argued, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.271
In rejecting his claim, the Court emphasized the importance of the family
unit citing again cases like Yoder, Stanley, Meyer, and PrinceT? It noted that
Quilloin was not seeking to protect a family but rather to prevent recognition
of an existing family unit.?" The court also noted that Quilloin had never
before sought custody and that the child would not be going into an entirely
new family but rather into a pre-existing family unir'" with which he was
already familiar. Consequently, allowing the adoption and denying the
legitimation could lawfully be based on the best interests of the child. 275
Quilloin could be treated differently than a divorced or separated father
because at some point, unlike Quillion, each had a responsibility for the
child.276
In Caban v. Mohammed/" the Court came to a different conclusion
based mainly on the fact that the unwed father, Caban, had a substantial
relationship with his children.i" Mr. Caban lived with the mother and the
children for several years, he was listed as the father on their birth certificates,
and he supported them financially.F" Under New York law, the children
could not be adopted without the natural mother's consent and only she could
veto an adoption.i" The father had no say in the matter, even ifhe did have
a substantial parental relationship with the children.?" Mrs. Mohammad
267. Quilloin, 434 U.s. at 251.
268. [d. at 257.
26~ [d. at 251.
270. [d. at 253.
271. [d. at 252.
272. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. "We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship
between parent and child is constitutionally protected." [d.
273. [d.
274. [d.
275. [d.
276. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
277. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
278. [d.
279. [d. at 382.
280. [d. at 386.
281. [d. at 386-87.
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consented to her husband adopting the children.i" Based on state law, a New
York court allowed Mr. Mohammed to adopt the children, despite Caban's
objection.i"
The Mohammeds argued that the distinction between fathers and mothers
was justified by the fundamental difference between maternal and paternal
relationships-the mother normally has a closer relationship with the child
than does the father.i" In addition, the distinction was substantially related
to the state's interest in promoting adoption of illegitimate children.i"
The Court rejected both arguments and concluded that the presumption
that mothers were closer to their children was not necessarily correct as
illustrated by Caban's relationship with his children.!" It held that the
distinction made between unwed mothers and fathers was not substantially
related to the state's interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate
children.i" In a footnote the Court noted the importance in cases like Caban
of the fact that a strong, ongoing, and durable relationship existed between the
father and child.i"
In Lehr v. Robensoni'" the Court made a distinction between a
developed family relationship and a potential relationship.F" Mr. Lehr failed
to follow the methods set out by New York law to establish his right to notice
of the proposed adoption of his child."! Under New York law, had he
registered on the putative father register he would have been entitled to
notice.i" Lehr did not register.?" Emphasizing once again the protected
nature of family rights.i" the Court discussed the distinction between a
biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility.295
282. Caban, 441 U.S. at 384.
283. [d.
284. [d. at 388.
285. [d. at 389-90.
286. [d. at 389.
287. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
288. ld. at 393 n.14. "In Quilloin v. Walcott, we noted the importance in cases of this kind of the
relationship that in fact exists between the parent and the child." [d. (citation omitted).
289. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
290. [d.
291. [d. at 251.
292. ld.
293. ld. at 251-52.
294. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257.
In some cases, however, this Court has held that the Federal Constitution supersedes state
law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family relationships. In those
cases ... the Court has emphasized the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has
noted that the rights of parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.
ld.
295. [d. at 259-60.
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The Court held that Lehr had only the opportunity to develop a relationship
with his child.i" Had he grasped that opportunity and accepted some
responsibility for the child, the Constitution would have protected that
relationship."? The putative father registry set up by New York law was
adequate to protect Lehr's potential relationship.?" Consequently, the
adoption of Lehr's biological child could go forward without him receiving
notice or a hearing."?
Finally, in Michael H. and Victoria D. v. Gerald D.,300 the Court declined
to give constitutional protection to an unwed father as a parent, despite his
pre-existing relationship with his child. The child's legal parents, Carole and
Gerald, married in 1976.301 In 1978, Carole had an affair with Michael and
later discovered that she was pregnant. Carole gave birth to Victoria in
1981.302 Gerald was listed as Victoria's father on her birth certificate and he
always held Victoria out as his daughter.i'" After a DNA test revealed that
Michael was in fact Victoria's biological father, Michael established a
relationship with Victoria and held her out as his daughter.f"
Despite marital problems, Gerald and Carole decided to remain together
and raise Victoria as their daughter.l" After being denied visitation with
Victoria, Michael filed an action seeking visitation rights and a declaration
that he was her father. However, Michael was not successful because of a
California statute that created a presumption that the mother's husband was
the father of any child born during the marriage so long as the husband was
not impotent or sterile.P" This presumption could only be challenged by one
ofthe spouses.?" Based on this statute, the California courts denied Michael's
296. [d. at 264.
297. [d. at 260-61.
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. Ifhe
grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future,
he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will
not automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests
lie.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
298. [d. at 262.
299. [d. at 264-65.
300. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
301. [d. at 113.
302. [d.
303. [d. at 113-114.
304. [d. at 114.
305. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
306. [d. at 119.
307. u.
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petition.?" He appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that he was being
deprived of a relationship with Victoria without being given a chance to
demonstrate his patemity.l"
The Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, rejected this claim, holding
that Michael had no constitutionally protected interest in his parental
relationship with Victoria.l'? Once again, the Court returned to its holdings
in the family rights cases."! The liberty interests protected by the
Constitution are based on history and tradition."! They are rights "so deeply
imbedded within the society's traditions as to be a fundamental right.'?"
Michael's relationship with Victoria did not fall into this category.314 In fact,
society has never protected such an interest.!" On the other hand, society has
always protected marriages from claims such as those made by Michael which
could disrupt family unity.!"
Even though Michael was Victoria's biological father and had a
relationship with her, neither he nor Victoria had a fundamental right to that
relationship. Such a right has never been recognized and protected by society
and therefore it was not entitled to constitutional protection in this case. The
biological relationship plus his continued contact with Victoria did not result
in a fundamental liberty interest. Instead, the fundamental liberty interest
must be based in history and tradition.
The court in Bobbijean and V.R. is partially correct when it suggests that
the holding in Stanley implies that the responsibility to raise a child is part of
the right to father a child. Certainly, the facts of the case indicate that Stanley,
the father, was in fact caring for his children. This supported the conclusion
that he had a relationship with them that due process should protect. 317 It does
not necessarily follow from this conclusion that in order to have the right to
procreate, one must have the ability or desire to care for a child. It is possible
that the Court would have reached a different conclusion had Stanley not been
308. [d.
309. [d. at 120.
310. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121.
311. [d. at 119-21. "It is an established part of our constitutional jurisprudence that the term 'liberty'
in the Due Process Clause extends beyond freedom from physical restraint." [d. (citing Pierce v. Society
ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390).
312. [d. at 123.
313. [d. at Ill. "In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not
merely that the interest denominated as a 'liberty' be 'fundamental' (a concept that, in isolation, hard to
objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally protected by our society." [d. at 122.
314. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
315. [d. at 124.
316. [d. In a footnote to the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia discusses extensively the role of societal
tradition in determining protected rights. [d. at 127 n.6.
317. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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involved with his children. This factual difference would have only led to the
the conclusion that Stanley could not object to the presumption that he was an
unfit parent."! It would only affect his right to have a relationship with his
children. However, it would not mean that he had no right to become a
biological father in the first place.
The cases discussed above that address the rights of unwed fathers hold
that the rights protected are those that rise out of a relationship. In each the
Court emphasized the importance of family-like relationships when dealing
with the rights of unwed fathers."? Taken together these cases point to one
conclusion: biological parents only have protected constitutional rights to
children with whom they have a relationship. This clearly means that in the
absence of a relationship, parental rights can be terminated and adoption by
another adult can be permitted.F" By analogy, perhaps this means that
individuals do not have a right to bring children into the world with whom
they cannot have or do not want to have a parental relationship. This
conclusion, however, is far from clear.
Similar to other unwed father cases, Michael H. does not deal directly
with the right of an unwed father to create a child, rather it deals with the
unwed father's right to have a relationship with a child he has already
created."! The rule stated in Michael H. could be applied to a "no more kids"
condition. Just as there is no historical protection for a father in Michael H.' s
position, there is no historical protection of the right to have children for
whom you cannot or will not provide. In fact, history and tradition favor
parents caring for their own children. If there is no such right, nothing
prevents a state from imposing a "no more kids" condition on those who are
unable or unwilling to provide for their own children.322
The unwed father cases deal with a father's right to custody or his right
to a relationship with his biological child. These cases do not deal with his
right to father the child in the first place. Consequently, although they shed
some light on the question being considered, these cases do not provide a
318. This is the conclusion the Court reached in later cases involving fathers who sought to assert
protected rights but had not developed relationships with their children. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249;
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 252. See also supra notes 161-180 and accompanying text.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Michael n., 491 U.S. at 121.
322. This is clearly seen in the area of child support. To many people, the idea that any parent should
escape a requirement to provide some level of financial support to offspring despite the parent's disability
or poverty is difficult to accept. See Angela F. Epps, To Payor Not to Pay, That Is the Question: Should
SSI Recipients Be Exemptfrom Child Support Obligations?, 34 RUT. L.J. 63, 70 (2002). This rationale
supports the decision in State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001) (imposing a "no more kids"
condition on a father who failed to pay child support).
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definitive answer. On the other hand, cases involving the right to freedom in
procreation decisions deal with procreation rather than parental rights to
children, and thus come closer to answering the initial question presented.F'
N. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM IN PROCREATION DECISIONS: ORIGINS AND
HISTORY
Skinner v. Oklahoma'" was the first case to recognize the existence of
a right to freedom in procreation decisions. The Court struck down an
Oklahoma statute that allowed for the involuntary sterilization of habitual
criminals. Under the statute, a person who committed larceny could be
sterilized. On the other hand, someone who embezzled, regardless of how
much was stolen, was not subjected to sterilization. The Court applied strict
scrutiny to the classification made by the statute because of the "basic liberty"
involved.F' Although Skinner is often cited as the basis for the right to
freedom in procreation decisions, the Court did not specifically state that this
was a constitutional right. Rather, it decided the case on equal protection
grounds, focusing on the irrational classification made by the statute. It
applied strict scrutiny and thereby acknowledged the fundamental nature of
the right to procreate. In subsequent cases, the Court found what appears to
be a permanent home, as part of the to privacy, for the right to freedom in
procreation decisions.f"
Griswold v. Connecticur" was the first case in which the Court
recognized a right to privacy. The petitioners in Griswold challenged a state
law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to married couples. The
Court struck down the law, concluding that there is a zone of privacy created
by several fundamental guarantees found in the Bill of Rights. 328 The Court
323. Cases involving fathers who assume a parental relationship believing that they are the child's
biological father, and later discover they are not, provide an interesting contrast. One such case illustrates
the approach taken by some courts. In Paternity ofCheryl, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96 (Mass. 200 I), the court
refused to set aside a paternity order as requested by a legal father who developed a parental relationship
with his child over a period of eleven years only to learn that the child had no biological link to him. The
court concluded that he had waited so long to challenge the paternity determination that it was not in the
child's best interest to set aside the paternity order. Thus the relationship he had developed over the years
was more significant than the biological connection. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Celebration 50 Article and
Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27 HARv.WOMENS' LJ. 323 (2004) for additional discussion of
this issue. Professor Bartholet argues that such results are appropriate: "[O]nce a child-parent relationship
has been created, we should not let it be destroyed simply because there is no DNA match. Parenting, once
undertaken, is or should be a lifetime responsibility." Id. at 324.
324. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
325. Id. at 541.
326. Id.
327. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
328. Id. at 485-86. Justice Douglas suggested several possible constitutional sources for the right to
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described the right to marital privacy as penumbral to other constitutional
rights but did not find a specific place for it in the Constitution. The Court's
decision in Griswold was based in large part on history and tradition. The
Court cited the family rights cases in support of its conclusions.
Subsequently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,329 a case which challenged a state
prohibition on the distribution ofcontraceptives to unmarried individuals, the
Court concluded that: "If the right ofprivacy means anything it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.,,330 The prohibition in Baird was struck
down on equal protection grounds because the law at issue treated single
persons differently than it treated married persons?"
The landmark abortion case of Roe v. Wade332provided the opportunity
for the Court to clearly explain the constitutional basis for the right to privacy.
In Roe, the Court held that the right to an abortion is a personal right implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty included in the guarantee of personal
privacy.l" In discussing the nature of the right to an abortion, the Court noted
that the rights to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education are all within the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of liberty and restriction on state action.l" Once again, in Carey v.
Population ServicesF" the Court discussed the nature of the right to privacy.
It struck down a state law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to
those under the age of sixteen and provided that only a pharmacist could
distribute contraceptives to those over the age of sixteen.?" The Court
reiterated its holding in Roe that one aspect of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a right of personal privacy. 337
Included in this zone of privacy is the independence to make important
privacy. The possible sources listed were the First Amendment with its right of association, the Third
Amendment prohibition against quartering soldiers in private homes, the Fourth Amendment protection
from unreasonable search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment privilege to be free from forced self-
incrimination, and finally, the Ninth Amendment which provides that other rights not specifically
mentioned by the Constitution are still retained by the people. [d. at 484. Justice Douglas concluded that
the right to privacy was among "penumbral" rights of "privacy and repose." [d. at 485.
329. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
330. [d. at 453.
331. [d. at 454-55.
332. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
333. [d. at 152-53.
334. [d.
335. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
336. [d. at 681-82.
337. [d. at 684.
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decisions regarding marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education.338
Twenty years later, in PlannedParenthoodofSoutheastem Pennsylvania
v. Casey,339 the Court revisited the issues raised in Roe. In Casey, the Court
reaffirmed its basic holding in Roe that a woman has a fundamental right to
an abortion.l" The Court, however, modified its holding in Roe by rejecting
the trimester framework.t" In its place, the Court adopted an approach that
examines whether the state has placed an undue burden on the right to obtain
an abortion.l" The Court stated that "[i]t is settled now, as it was when the
Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on
a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family
and parenthood.'?"
Lawrence v. Taylorr" provides a summary of the cases involving the
right to privacy in procreation decisions. The holding in Lawrence may in fact
support imposition of the "no more kids" condition. In a 5-4 decision, the
Lawrence Court held that the liberty interest protected by the Constitution
includes protection from unwarranted government intrusion into a private
dwelling and self autonomy in certain intimate conduct.. One of the issues
raised in the Lawrence case was whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prevented a state from criminalizing adult consensual
sexual intimacy in the home.l"
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion traced the history of the right to
privacy. It noted that broad statements regarding the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause were made in Pierce, Meyer, and Griswold. Justice
Kennedy began the analysis with a review of Griswold, which emphasized the
protected space of the marital bedroom. Next, he moved to Eisenstadt which
made it clear that the interest protected in Griswold extended to unmarried
persons.?" Justice Kennedy quoted the Eisenstadt Court: "if the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or begat a
child.,,347 After examining Eisenstadt, Justice Kennedy moved to Roe, which
338. [d. at 684-85.
339. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
340. [d. at 846.
341. [d. at 873.
342. [d. at 877.
343. [d. at 849.
344. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
345. [d. at 564.
346. [d. at 564-65.
347. [d. at 565.
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established the right of a woman to make fundamental decisions affecting her
pregnancy. This right is protected as a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause. Finally, he discussed Carey, which extended the protection ofprivacy
interests by holding that the state could not prohibit distribution of
contraceptives to those under sixteen.l"
The Lawrence majority framed the issue as whether the petitioners were
free as adults to engage in private consensual homosexual conduct.l" It also
considered whether the majority of society could use the criminal law to
enforce its moral views on society as a whole.P" The Court concluded that the
moral views of the majority do not provide a legitimate state interest and that
adults have a protected liberty interest in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in sexual matters. The Court emphasized that the case did not involve
minors, injury, coercion, or abuse of a superior relationship. As a result, the
state had no legitimate interest in prohibiting this type of conduct.l"
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that any fundamental liberty must be
rooted in this nation's history and traditions. The liberty interest being
considered by the Court was not rooted in tradition. As no fundamental
liberty was involved, the challenged law need only promote a legitimate state
interest.l" Justice Scalia considered moral beliefs to be a legitimate
interest.l" He noted that the majority's rationale would protect all sorts of
conduct including bigamy, fornication, adultery, and bestiality.354 He charged
that majority had signed on to the homosexual agenda.l"
These decisions demonstrate that there is a right to privacy in procreation
decisions that is distinct from the family integrity rights discussed in other
cases. Skinner involved involuntary sterilization.l" Although Griswold dealt
specifically with marital privacy and the right of married people to make
decisions about procreation, Baird extended the right to unmarried
individuals. The latter appears to have nothing to do with "family integrity"
or relationships. Instead, it deals with the right of an individual to decide
whether or not he or she will become a parent.
348. [d. at 565-66.
349. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
350. [d. at 571.
351. [d. at 578.
352. [d. at 593.
353. [d. at 599.
354. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600.
355. [d. at 602.
356. 316 U.S. 535, 541. The Court refers to the rights of marriage and procreation. This could mean
that right to procreation is only protected within the bounds of marriage. Such a view would be consistent
with the social mores at the time Skinner was decided. However, at the core of the Skinner decision is the
right to create a child. Sterilization ends that right but would not end the right to marry.
2008] THE RIGHT RESPONSIBIliTY 117
Lawrence seems to support both sides of the issue. It gives protection
to conduct that takes place in private between two consenting adults. Such
protection is provided to parents who wish to engage in sexual conduct in
order to become pregnant. On the other hand, the conduct protected affects
no one other than the adults who have decided to engage in the relationship.
Creation of a child brings the interest of third parties into the picture. The
children that have been and have yet to be created, as well as the society that
will be called on to protect and care for the children, are all potential victims.
The Court in Lawrence held that there is a right for adults to engage in
private consensual homosexual conduct. It seems that this right would end
when the conduct adversely impacts innocent children. The conclusion that
could be drawn from Lawrence is that parents have the liberty to engage in
private sexual conduct but no liberty to create a child who may be the victim
of abuse. The existence of victims and potential victims may be enough for
the Court to conclude that a "no more kids" condition is permissible under
Lawrence. Thus, Lawrence may actually support the "no more kids"
condition if the condition in fact protects innocent children.F" Such a
conclusion would be inconsistent with the decisions in Roe and Casey, that
protect a woman's right to choose an abortion despite the obvious negative
impact on the child.l" It would also call into question Skinner, which
prohibited involuntary sterilization.l"
The court in Bobbijean and V.R. concluded that the right to freedom in
procreation decisions is somehow affected by the cases involving family
integrity.i'" In fact, the family integrity decisions address a different concern.
If the right to freedom in procreation fits within the right to privacy discussed
in Baird, Roe, and Casey, then any restriction on that right must pass the strict
scrutiny test. Instead of using cases dealing with the right to freedom in
procreation to analyze the "no more kids" condition, the court focused on
cases from other areas, including those dealing with family integrity and cases
dealing with the rights of unwed fathers. The key to analyzing the situation
presented by Bobbijean and V.R. is not the protected nature of the parent-child
relationship, but rather under what circumstances the state may interfere with
the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom in procreation decisions. As
with any other constitutional right, the state may interfere if it has a
compelling interest and does so using a narrowly tailored means.
A possible answer to the question of whether a "no more kids" condition
is lawfully permissible is found in the approach taken by some courts dealing
357. See supra notes 219-30 and the accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 207-18 and the accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 323 and the accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 262-301 and the accompanying text.
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with the use of probation conditions that restrict the right to freedom in
procreation decisions.
V. PROBATION CONDITIONS: A COMPARISON
Some courts have sought to impose a "no more kids" condition on
probationers who have been convicted of child abuse. In one case, the court
imposed the condition on a man convicted of failure to pay child support.
Although cases decided by state courts addressing the parameters of a right
protected by the federal Constitution are not final authority, the analysis used
by the courts in these cases suggests a possible framework for the analysis of
the condition imposed as part of a in case plan.
A. Probation Restrictions on Procreation: Child Abuse Cases
In some situations, criminal prosecution is an option available to the state
in dealing with child maltreatment. If the state chooses this option, a similar
issue may arise if the trial court dealing with a criminal offense (child
endangerment, battery, etc.) attempts to impose a "no more kids" condition as
part of a criminal sentence. The majority of attempts to impose "no more
kids" conditions as part of a sentence to probation have been unsuccessful.
Discussion ofcases in which courts have attempted to impose such a condition
demonstrates a possible analysis and provides an interesting contrast."!
The majority of cases in which courts have attempted to impose a
probation condition restricting procreation involve offenders convicted of
child abuse. People v. Pointe~62 is one of those cases. Ruby Pointer was
devoted to a macrobiotic diet. The diet did not include fruits, milk products,
meat, fish, poultry, or eggs. 363 Pointer put her two children on the diet and as
a result, they were seriously injured. Pointer was convicted of felony child
endangerment and placed on probation for five years. One condition of her
probation was that she not conceive a child while on probation.l" In choosing
to impose the condition, the trial court considered testimony from a
psychologist, who indicated that if the children were ever returned to Pointer,
she would put them back on the diet. In addition, she would treat any
subsequent children the same way. Finally, because of her fear of chemicals,
361. See Angela F. Epps, Unacceptable Collateral Damage: The Danger ofProbation Conditions
Restricting the Right to Have Children, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv.611, 623-634 (2005).
362. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128 (App. Ct. 1984).
363. [d. at 1131-32, n.2.
364. [d. at 1133.
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she would not take birth control pills. 365 Pointer challenged the probation
condition as a violation of her freedom to make procreation decisions.l"
In analyzing the probation condition, the appellate court noted that the
objective of a probation condition is to foster rehabilitation and protect the
public. Any probation condition must be reasonably related to this goa1.367
The Pointer court determined that the probation condition directly related to
the crime Pointer had committed. Her crime was child endangerment and the
condition related to her ability to procreate. The condition forbade conduct
that was reasonably related to future criminal acts because, as a result of her
commitment to the diet, Pointer would endanger any child she had in the
future. Indeed, due to her belief in the macrobiotic diet, a child could be
endangered by her conduct before its birth. 368
Next the court considered whether the condition was too broad, noting
that such a heightened level ofscrutiny requires that the condition be narrowly
drawn. If there is an alternative to the restriction on procreation, the
alternative must be used. To the extent such a condition is overly broad, it is
not reasonably related to the compelling state interest of reforming and
rehabilitating the defendant.t" The court concluded that there was indeed an
alternative to restricting Pointer's right to procreate. Instead of using the
procreation restriction, Pointer could be required to submit to pregnancy
testing periodically. Ifpregnant, she could be required to follow an intensive
prenatal and neonatal program monitored by a physician. Ifnecessary for the
child's safety, the child could be removed from her custody at birth."? The
court was concerned that Pointer, fearing that the judge would throw her in
jail should she become pregnant, would be coerced into having an abortion.
Because there were alternatives to the probation condition, it was not the least
restrictive alternative and was therefore invalid.'?'
Courts in other child abuse cases have followed an analysis similar to
that used in Pointer and have reached the same conclusion.?" Probation
365. [d. at 1136.
366. [d. at 1133.
367. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 1138.
368. [d.
369. [d. at 1139.
370. [d. at 1140.
371. [d. at 1140-41.
372. See State v, Howland, 420 So.2d 918 (Ra. Ct. App. 1982); Rodriguez v. Florida, 378 So.2d 7
(Fla. Ct. App. 1979); State v, Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan, Ct. App. 1989); State v. Livingston, 372
N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). Livingston involved a twenty-year-old unmarried woman convicted
of child abuse for placing an infant on a space heater. She was ordered not to have children while on a five-
year probation. The court held that the condition was invalid. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1337-38. In
Howland, the defendant was convicted of negligent child abuse. He was sentenced to five years of
probation, during which time he was prohibited from fathering any other children. Howland, 420 So.2d
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conditions that restrict freedom in procreation decisions have been determined
to be invalid despite legitimate concerns about the physical danger the
offender poses to other children.
One notable exception is Oregon v. Kline.373 In that case, the defendant
Mr. Kline was convicted of first-degree criminal mistreatment. While on
thirty-six months probation for this offense, he abused his two and a half year
old daughter by breaking her leg, throwing her in a crib, and cursing at her.374
Prior to this conviction, Mr. Kline and his wife had their parental rights to
their first child terminated as a result of child abuse.?" During the hearing to
determine whether his probation should revoked, the court added a condition
to Kline's probation. He was not to father additional children until he
completed drug counseling and anger management treatment.!" On appeal,
the court upheld this condition because of concern for the children's safety.
It noted that the condition was not a total ban on Mr. Kline's reproductive
rights.I" The trial court retained the ability to modify the condition when Mr.
Kline completed his treatment.378
B. Probation Conditions Restricting Procreation: Child Support Cases
Despite the holdings in cases involving child abuse which seem to
indicate that probation conditions will not be permitted if a reasonable
alternative exists, the Wisconsin Supreme Court allowed such a condition to
be imposed on a father who had a history of failing to pay child support. In
State v. Oakley379 the defendant fathered nine children by four different
women.I" Oakley was able to work."! He had worked in the past, yet he
refused to pay his court-ordered child support.t" Oakley had been convicted
several times of criminal nonsupport. He had been put in jail and fined in an
at 919. In Rodriguez, the defendant pled nolo contendere to charge of aggravated child abuse for hitting
her nine-year-old daughter. She was ordered not to marry, become pregnant, or have custody of her
children while on probation. The restriction on having custody of children was permitted, but the others
were removed. Rodriguez. 378 So.2d at 10. The court in Mosburg cited Pointer, Rodrigeuz, and
Livingston in support of its decision to remove a probation condition requiring that Ms. Mosburg not
become pregnant during her two years of probation. Ms. Mosburg was charged with child endangerment
for abandoning her newborn child. Mosburg, 768 P.2d at 315.
373. 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
374. [d. at 698.
375. [d.
376. [d. at 699.
377. [d.
378. Kline, 963 P.2d at 699.
379. 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2(01).
380. [d. at 202.
381. [d.
382. [d. at 206.
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effort to get him to pay.383 Still, Oakley had not paid.?" Oakley pled no-
contest to three counts of intentionally refusing to support his children in
violation of Wisconsin law.385 The judge rejected the state's request that
Oakley be sentenced to six years in prison, choosing instead to place him on
probation to allow him the opportunity to work and support his children.386
The trialjudge conditioned Oakley's probation on him not fathering additional
children until he could show that he was supporting the nine he already had.
Oakley argued that this condition was an unconstitutional restriction on
his right to procreate.l" On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded
that this condition passed constitutional muster because of Oakley's status as
a convicted felon.l" The court discussed the problems with failure to pay
child support and its serious long-term consequences to children: poor health,
behavioral problems, delinquency, and low educational advancement.l"
Declining to apply the strict scrutiny test, which is traditionally applied in
cases involving fundamental rights, the court instead considered whether the
condition was overly broad and whether it was reasonably related to the goal
of rehabilitating Oakley.l"
The court concluded that the condition was narrowly tailored to serve the
state's compelling interest of having parents support their children and
rehabilitating Oakley through probation rather than prison. The condition was
not overly broad because it did not eliminate Oakley's right to procreate.l"
He could have more children, without court approval, once he completed his
probation or met his obligation to support his children.i" The condition was
reasonably related to his rehabilitation because it prevented him from violating
the law by intentionally failing to support additional children.?" The only
alternative the court considered was incarceration, which it noted would
eliminate Oakley's right to procreate.l"
383. [d. at 207.
384. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203.
385. See WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 948.22(2) (West 2007).
386. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208.
387. [d. at 212.
388. [d. at 208.
389. [d. at 204.
390. [d. at 210.
391. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212.
392. [d.
393. [d.
394. [d.
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C. Probation Cases vs. Child Deprivation Cases
Applying the analysis used by the courts in these cases suggests how the
same type of condition in disposition plans should be analyzed. Ms. Pointer
is very similar to the parents in Bobbijean and V.R. Her children were
removed from her custody due to maltreatment. In addition, the Pointer Court
concluded that a pattern ofmaltreatment had begun and would likely continue.
In Bobbijean and V.R., the parents had already established a continuing pattern
ofmaltreatment. Following the Pointer analysis, the condition would not pass
muster.
The question boils down to whether there was a reasonable alternative
available that would not impinge on the right to freedom in procreation
decisions. The court in Pointer concluded that there was a reasonable
alternative. Likewise in Bobbijean and V.R., the same types of reasonable
alternatives exist. The court or a CPS worker could monitor the mother while
pregnant and remove the child from her custody should that become necessary
for the child's safety. In addition, there is an issue of coerced abortions in
both situations. The Pointer Court was concerned that Ms. Pointer, should
she become pregnant, would have an abortion in order to avoid going to jail
for violating a condition of her probation.t" Bobbijean and V.R. raise the
same concern. Although the court states that contempt and six months injail
is possible.I" it also says it is not encouraging the women involved to have an
abortion should they become pregnant.397 Yet its order could very well place
the women in the position of having to choose between aborting a child and
spending time in jail. It could also create the odd situation of the women
choosing to sacrifice the life of one child for the possibility of regaining
custody of another child.
Under the Kline analysis, the result would be different. Mr. Kline also
had an established pattern of child maltreatment. The court imposed a "no
more kids" condition in addition to other requirements that were geared
towards rehabilitating Kline. The ban was temporary and only lasted until
probation expired or Kline completed anger management training, drug
rehabilitation, and parenting classes. This is very similar to the "no more
kids" condition in a case plan. The plan, like Kline's probation order, con-
tains other requirements that, if fulfilled, will ensure the safety of the child
and help the parent to become competent. It is temporary and only lasts for
the period of probation or court supervision. Under this approach, the
condition is acceptable.
395. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1141 (App. Ct. 1984)
396. In re V.R., at *5.
397. In re Bobbijean P., 2004 WL 834480, at *6; In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *7.
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Finally, using the Oakley analysis, the same conclusion would be reached
and the condition would be permissible; it is a temporary prohibition aimed
at rehabilitating the parent and protecting the child. The same can be said of
the condition in a disposition plan.
Pointer, Kline, and Oakley provide two ways of looking at the same
problem. Each court was forced to decide what it could do to protect a child
while rehabilitating the parent offender. The problem is not, however, with
creating the child; it is failing to take proper care of the child. Using the "no
more kids" condition is not the only option that can be used to protect the
child and rehabilitate the parent. Because a fundamental right is at stake,
courts should be forced to apply strict scrutiny and to consider these
alternatives.
VI. STRICT SCRUTINY: PROPER ANALYSIS OF THE No MORE CHILDREN
CONDmON
To properly analyze the condition, we should ask the questions normally
asked when dealing with alleged infringements upon what may be a
fundamental right. First, we need to ask whether a fundamental right is
involved. Based on Skinner, Griswold, Baird, and Roe, there is a fundamental
right to freedom in procreation decisions.?" The court in V.R. seems to
acknowledge as much by its attempt to explain how the imposition of the "no
more kids" condition meets the strict scrutiny test.399 After finding a
fundamental right, the next question to ask is whether the challenged action
impinges on that right. The condition is involuntarily imposed by a state actor
and restricts a person's right to make procreation decisions.
The next consideration deals with the state's interest. First, we must ask
if there is a compelling state interest involved. If so, we must determine
whether the challenged action actually furthers the state interest. Finally, we
must consider whether there is a less restrictive alternative to the challenged
state action. Each of these questions will be discussed below.
A. What Is the Compelling State Interest?
The state may seek to further a compelling interest by restricting the
exercise of a fundamental right. It is therefore important to identify the
compelling interests at stake in order to determine whether the restriction
398. The fundamental nature of the right to freedom in procreation decisions is explored above and
will not be considered further. See supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
399. "10 reaching the decision to order the respondent to conceive no more children, ... this court
has considered the following factors. The court offers theses factors as a 4-prong test narrowly tailored to
meet the 'strict scrutiny test' for impinging on constitutional rights." In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *8.
124 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34
furthers that interest. Part of this determination involves considering whether
the restriction is effective to accomplish the stated goal and whether the goal
can be accomplished by using another means that does not infringe upon a
fundamental right. The court in V.R. and Bobbijean identified two interests
at stake. First, there is the interest of the children in being raised by their own
parents in a safe environment. In addition, there is the right of society not to
be burdened with caring for the children of parents who cannot or will not
care for them.f" Are these compelling state interests actually furthered by the
"no more kids" condition?
Protecting children from further danger is clearly a compelling state
interest. That goal has been accomplished by removing the children from the
home and placing them in a foster home or some other alternative placement.
This is an adequate solution to the problem ofkeeping the children physically
safe unless foster care or other alternatives available to the state do not
provide a safe environment for the children. Children have the right to be
raised by their own parents and parents have the right to the care and custody
of their children unless and until the state demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit.'?' Children have a right to be
raised in a safe and secure environment. Ideally, it should be provided by the
parents, but this is not necessary or required. Other adults can provide this
safe environment when the biological parents cannot.
The interests of unborn children raise a different issue. A child has no
express right to be born to fit and competent parents. It is difficult to argue
that a child has a right not be born unless it will be born to parents who have
the ability and the desire to care for him or her. The essence of such an
argument is that it would be better for the child to have no life at all rather
than a life that involves being cared for by someone other than his or her
biological parents. The absence of the right is illustrated by the fact that those
born with physical conditions, not properly diagnosed prior to birth, who seek
tort damages in wrongful life actions are normally met with the response that
such claims are not recognized by the law. The refusal to recognize such a
claim is based on policy concerns raised by allowing someone to argue that
they would be better off had they never been born in the first place. In
essence, one would be arguing that non-existence would have been better than
life with an impairment.f"
400. Id. at *7.
401. Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
402. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40
MARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv.141 (2005). This article discusses the psychological costs to disabled persons, the
disabled community, and society from allowing tort actions based on the idea that one was wrongfully born
or that one's life is wrongful. The author discusses the history of wrongful death and wrongful life actions.
She found that only three states allowed actions for wrongful life. Id. at 161. She concludes that neither
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The real interest the court seeks to protect is the interest of society not to
be burdened with the financial and moral responsibility of caring for the
children involved. The court emphasized the financial cost of foster care as
well as the problems society encounters because of imperfect outcomes for
children raised in foster care.403 There are poor outcomes for foster care
children but there are also positive outcomes.r" This makes it even more
objectionable for a court to determine that due to the bad outcomes it is better
for children not to be born then to end up in foster care. Even those raised in
foster care or in other placements go on to live healthy and productive lives
and make great contributions to society. The bottom line seems to be the
financial cost involved in providing for children whose parents will not
provide for them.
The expenditure involved is not sufficient to create a compelling state
interest. First, the percentage of children who will spend some amount of time
action should be allowed because recovery on such claims negates rather than affirms the value of the
plaintiffs life. "This effect is most apparent in the wrongful life context, where recovery turns on the jury's
conclusion that life with impairments is objectively worse than non-existence." Id. at 176. Although the
focus of Professor Hensel's article is individuals born with impairments of a different type, an analogy can
be made to those born whose destiny may be foster care. Imposition of a "no more kids" condition says to
children living in foster care and to society that life in foster care or in the care of others is worse than non-
existence.
403. In re Bobbjean, 2004 WL 834480, at *4-*5; In re V.R., 2004 WL 302984, at *8 n.18.
404. There are shortcomings to life in the foster care system. See NOBODY'S CHILDREN, supra note
I, at 81-97. Foster care often does not provide the nurturing environment that a child needs to flourish.
Due to this deficiency, in many cases it serves to compound rather than remedy the problems the child
already has as a result of physical abuse or neglect. Id. at 96. In addition, there is a lack of quality foster
homes for children in need. Consequently, some are subject to further abuse or neglect in the foster care
system. Id. at 86.
In their book, ONTHEIR OWN: WHAT HAPPENS TOKIDsWHEN THEy AGE OUTOFTHE FOSTER
CARE SYSTEM? (Westview Press 2004) [hereinafter ONTHEIR OWN],Martha Shirk and Gary Stangler tell
the stories of children who grew up in the foster care system. These stories reveal both success and failure.
Consider the story of three brothers who ended up in foster care because their home was abusive. Id. at 17.
The three, Jerrnaine, Jeffrey, and Lamar were born just one year apart. Id. After bouncing from foster home
to foster home, they were placed in Children's Village. Id. Lamar settled in, but Jermaine and Jeffrey did
not. Id. When the boys became teenagers, Jermaine and Jeffrey ran away several times. Id. They returned
to their old neighborhood and began selling drugs. Id. By the time they aged out of foster care, both were
in prison. Id. at 18. The youngest brother, Lamar, stayed at the Village and benefited from the programs
offered there. He became a star athlete in high school and was awarded a partial scholarship to college.
Id. When he graduated from college in 1999, he obtained a job with a major national firm earning $72,000
a year. Id. By 2002, he was happily married and looking forward to building a new home. Id.
Unfortunately, by 2002 Jerrnaine was dead while Jeffrey remained in prison. Id. Despite being in prison,
Jeffrey was looking forward to being released from prison and going into business with his baby brother
at the end of 2005. Id. at 42.
Who could look at this situation and say that it would have been better had these children not
been born? One is living the "American Dream," thanks in part to the right foster care environment.
Another may yet achieve the dream.
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in foster care is small. For instance, on September 30, 2005 there were
513,000 children in foster care.405 That same year, there were an estimated
73.5 million children under eighteen in the United States.f" In addition, the
rate of victimization and the number of victims has been decreasing."? The
rate was 11.9 per one thousand children in 2004, resulting in 872,000
victims.f" The rate was 12.4 victims per one thousand children in 2003,
resulting in 906,000 victims.f" Finally, although foster care and child
protective services cost a considerable amount each year, the cost is minuscule
in comparison to other items in the federal budget. The total budget proposed
for fiscal year 2007 was $2.7 billion"? and only about $5 billion is being spent
on foster care services."! Society should be concerned about the expenditure
of tax dollars no matter how much or how little is involved. However, the
money is being spent for a good purpose-protecting the nation's children.
The amount is not so burdensome to society that it risks causing a financial
crisis. As illustrated by spending for the Global War on Terror-if the interest
is great enough, no monetary cost is too high."? This factor should be
considered in determining whether or not saving tax dollars is a compelling
interest sufficient to justify restrictions on fundamental rights.
B. Will the Condition Be Effective?
The moral force of the court's condition may be enough to lead the
parent to take steps not to have another child. If the parent complies with the
condition and all other steps laid out in the case plan, the parent should be able
405. AFCARSREPORT, supra note 66, at I.
406. U.S.Census Bureau,Resident PopulationEstimatesof the United Statesby Ageand Sex: April
I, 1990 to July I, 1999, with Short-Term Projection to November I, 2000 (2001),
http://www.census.gov/popest/archiveslI990slnat-agesex.txt.
407. CHIlDMALTREATMENT 2004 supra note 74, at xiv.
408. [d.
409. U.S.DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHIlDREN AND FAMILIES, ADMIN. ON
CHIlDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHIlDREN'S BUREAU, CHIlD MALTREATMENT 2003 xiv (2005),
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/prograrnslcb/pubslcm03/cm2003.pdf.
410. OFFICE OFMGMT. AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FIsCAL YEAR 2008, SUMMARY TABLE S-I
(2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/fy2008/pdflbudget/tables.pdf.
41 I. The amount budgeted by the Federal government is $4,593,000. The Federal government
matches 50% to 83% of the amount spent by states on foster care. This means that the total amount spent
on foster care is approximately$10 bilIion dollars. Children's Bureau, Title N-E Foster Care Program
Description,http://www.acf.hhs.gov/prograrnslcb/programs_fundlstate_triballfostercare.htm.
412. By the beginningof FY 2008, $426.8 billion dollars had been appropriated for Departmentof
DefenseOperationin the GlobalWaron Terror. The amount requestedby the Presidentfor FY2008 would
increase that amount to $661.9 bilIiondollars. OFFICE OFMGMT. AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET FOR FIsCAL
YEAR 2008, DEP'T OF DEF. (2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omblbudget/fyZ008/pdf/
budget/defense.pdf.
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to regain custody of his or her children. This seems to be the best result for
everyone.i"
The answer to whether the condition will be effective or not depends in
part on what happens if the parent becomes pregnant or fathers a child while
subject to the condition. The court in V.R. states that under New York law
willful violation of the disposition plan could result in six months in jai1.414
This result not only seems to be inconsistent with our commitment to liberty,
but also seems to be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.?" In
addition, it is possible that someone will be negligent in becoming pregnant.
If so, the condition could not be enforced by a contempt of court.
The real consequence of failure to comply with the condition may be that
the parents would not be able to successfully fulfill their obligations under the
disposition plan, and for that reason be unable to regain custody of the
children already in foster care. This would not be appropriate if the parents
have turned their lives around in other ways-their only shortcoming being
that they had another child. On the other hand, if they remain unsuitable
parents, not only will they not get the other children back, the newborn child
would be removed from their custody and placed in foster care. The ultimate
result would be the very thing the court was trying to prevent-another child
being placed into the foster care system. The condition would have had no
effect at all and it would not have furthered the compelling state interest.?"
If the "no more kids" condition impinges upon a fundamental right, and
the state has a compelling interest in protecting the country's children, it may
further that interest by a narrowly tailored means. The means chosen should
be the least restrictive alternative.
C. Are There Less Restrictive Alternatives?
There are alternatives to imposition of the "no more kids" condition that
will be effective to protect children and provide them with a stable and secure
413. See Adrienne McKay, Termination of Parental Rights in California: Why a Temporary
Prohibition on Conception Would Have Better Served Ethan N., 35 S.W. U. L. REv. 61 (2005) for a
discussion of how such a condition may have helped to avoid termination of parental rights. Ethan N.'s
mother,Carrie, had an assortmentof issues as a result of a persistentdrug problem. Reunificationservices
orderedincludeddrug rehabilitation and parentingclasses, but did not include a "no morekids" condition.
Id. at 64. The author argues that California should adopt a statute that allows imposition of such a
condition. Id. at 67.
414. In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at *5.
415. See A. FeleciaEpps, Unacceptable Collateral Damage: The Danger ofProbation Conditions
Restricting the Right to Have Children, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 611, 644-646 (2005).
416. Bobbijean's mother was pregnant again shortly after the court imposed the "no more kids"
condition. See JAMES G.DWYER, THE RELAnONSHIP RIGHTS OFCHIlDREN 29 (CambridgeUniversity Press
2006).
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environment while the parent takes steps to regain competence. The problem
in Bobbijean and V.R. was drug addiction. In both cases, the court noted this
background and also noted that other children had been removed from the
parent's custody due to the same problem."? It specifically mentioned that
drug treatment was part of prior case plans and that willful violations of the
terms in the case plan that become a court order could subject the parent to
contempt of court."" In fact, such willful failure to follow the plan was
actually a criminal offense under New York law punishable by up to six
months in jail.419
This raises the question of why the pre-existing conditions were not
enforced using the contempt power available to the court. It would seem
easier in one sense to force someone into drug treatment than to prevent them
from becoming pregnant or fathering a child. The same powers the court
seems willing to use to enforce the "no more kids" condition could be used to
enforce a requirement that the parent get drug treatment or attend parenting
classes. These steps had not been taken in Bobbijean and V.R. Had the
requirements imposed by other case plans been enforced, there may have been
no need for another child to be removed and another case plan to be created.
Compliance with conditions requiring parents to complete substance abuse
treatment and attend parenting classes are more likely to help parents become
competent and perhaps help them recognize for themselves that they are not
ready to have additional children. The imposition of a "no more kids"
condition would then not be necessary. The court chose to treat the symptom
--exposure of the child to drugs-rather than the underlying problem.
There are two promising alternatives to the imposition of the "no more
kids" condition. Both are programs that focus on providing individual treat-
ment plans for parents with substance abuse problems. Both have
demonstrated success in getting parents the help they need to overcome drug
and alcohol addiction and in reuniting parents with their children.
One program, Family Dependency Treatment Courts (FDTC), was first
implemented in Reno, Nevada in 1995.420 The goal ofFDTCs is to provide a
safe environment for the child while aggressively seeking to resolve the
parent's substance abuse problem as well as other problems that prevent
reunification of the tamily.?" FDTCs bring together a team of professionals
417. In re Bobbijean, 2004 WL 834480, at *2; In re V.R. 2004 WL 3029874, at *2.
418. In re V.R., 2004 WL 302984 at *5.
419. Id.
420. MEGHAN M. WHEELER & CARSON Fox, JR., NATIONAL DRUG COURT INS1TIUfE, DRUG COURT
PRAcrmONER FACT SHEET I (2006). The number of FDTCs grew to 198 by 2005. At that time, 188 more
were in the planning stages.
421. Id. at 3. The other problems addressed include housing, physical and mental health,
transportation, child care, education and employment. Id. at 5.
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with expertise in substance abuse recovery and child welfare issues.i" This
team, under judicial leadership, works together to assess the problem and
develop a plan that will best address the family's situation.f" FDTCs involve
frequent court appearances by the parents and frequent meetings with the
treatment team to review and adjust the plan as appropriate.f" The judge
provides encouragement, rewards, and also sanctions as needed to help the
parent successfully complete the treatment plan.425 A review of FDTCs in
four jurisdictions indicates that they increase the parent's chances of being
reunited with his or her child.426
The second program, implemented in lllinois in April 2000 for a five-
year test period, provides the parent with a Recovery Coach (RC).427 The RC
becomes involved in the case within ninety days of the temporary hearing and
provides proactive case management aimed at getting the parent into treatment
quickly and keeping the parent in treatment.?" Coaches engage in a number
of activities including comprehensive clinical assessments, advocacy, service
planning, outreach, and case management.t" The results of the illinois project
indicate that parents who had RCs accessed substance abuse treatment
programs earlier and successfully completed the programs at a higher rate than
those without RCs.430 There was also a modest increase in the number of
families reunified and a shorter time period to reunification.t"
The lllinois program reduced the amount spent on child welfare services.
FDTC should result in a savings by reducing the number of children entering
422. [d. at 3.
423. [d.
424. WHEELER & Fox, supra note 419, at 4.
425. [d.
426. NPCRESEARCH,FAMILvl'REATMENTDRUGCOURTEvALUATIONFINALPHASEISTUDVREPORT
54 (2006). This report notes that as of April 2006 there were 183 FDTCs operating in forty-three states
while 100 more were in development. [d. at 2. Although the statistics varied in the individual jurisdictions
reviewed, the overall evaluation ofFDTC indicated that they improved results in key areas. Significantly,
parents in FDTC were significantly more likely to be reunified with their children and less likely to have
their parental rights terminated. Children of parents in FDTCs experienced significantly shorter times to
permanent placement. [d. Parents were also more likely to enter treatment, remain in treatment and
complete treatment. [d.
427. JOSEPH P. nvAN, CHllDRENAND FAMll..VREsEARCH CENTER, 1UJN00S ALcOHOL AND OTHER
DRUGABUSE WAIVER DEMONSTRATION FINAL EVALUATION REPORT E-l (2006) [hereinafter ILLINOIS
WAIVER REPORT].
428. [d. at 1-5.
429. [d. at 1-3.
430. Parents with coaches accessed treatment in 74 days while those without coaches accessed
treatment in 108 days. Forty-three percent of those with coaches completed treatment. Twenty-three
percent of those without coaches completed treatment. [d. at 2-11 to 2-12.
431. 15.5% offamilies with coaches were likely to be reunified compared to 11.6% of those without
coaches. [d. at 3-3.
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foster care and reducing the amount of the time those children spend in foster
care. 432 A collateral benefit of these programs is that children born to parents
who complete the programs are born into safe environments. Both of these
programs provide a less restrictive alternative to the "no more kids" condition.
In addition, they target the root of the problem, which is substance abuse.
Once individualized services have been made available to the parents
through recovery coaches or family drug treatment courts, judges should not
be reluctant to terminate the parental rights of parents who have not been
successful is such programs. Use of programs in providing individualized
services tailored to the parent's needs would meet the requirement that states
use reasonable efforts to reunify the family.t" In addition, by failing to
complete an individualized program focused on their needs the parent would
have clearly demonstrated that he or she is not capable ofproviding a safe and
secure environment for his or her children. This would allow plans for
permanent placements to be implemented more quickly. Placement while the
child is young may be the key to success.t" Even in the cases of V.R. and
Bobbijean, reunification was the final goal of the case plan.t" Perhaps this
should not have been the case.?"
A more radical approach is suggested by Professor James Dwyer."?
Parents of a newborn child who have certain characteristics would be required
to petition a court for custody that child. 438 In Bobbijean's case, for instance,
Rodney and Stephanie would not automatically have the right to custody of
their biological children. They would be required to petition the court for
custody of their biological children rather than the state petitioning to remove
the children from Stephanie and Rodney.t" This approach is child-centered
and would protect the child from danger. It is questionable whether such a
432. It wasestimatedthat the programsavedthe state $5,615,534.57as ofSeptember2005. ILLINOIS
WANER REPORT, supra note 426, at 3-13.
433. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
434. This may explain whyLamar was successful while his brothers were not. Lamar was placed in
a supportiveenvironmentat a youngage. His brothers,both older,had a difficult timeadjusting. See supra
note 403.
435. In re Bobbijean, 2004 WL 834480, at ·3; In re V.R., 2004 WL 3029874, at ·11.
436. Professor James Dwyer seerns to question the wisdom of the courts decision. He notes that
despite its toughtalk, thecourt in Bobbijean orderedreunificationas thegoal for Bobbijeanand her parents
feeling that it was obligated to do so under New York law. Dwyer,supra note 415 at 29.
437. See James G. Dwyer,Symposium: Reforming Parentage Laws: A Child-Centered Approach to
Parentage Law, 14WM. & MARy BtILOFRTS. 1. 843, 860 (2006).
438. Id. at 848.
439. Id. Characteristicsinclude parents imprisonedat the timeof birth, parentswhohad harmedthe
child beforebirth by ingesting illegal drugs, and parents who had been previously found to have abused,
neglected,or committed a crime against any child.
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plan would be constitutional.t" In addition, such a plan would likely draw
public outrage rather than support.?" However, serious consideration of such
a procedure would perhaps draw attention to the need for additional resources
to combat the drug epidemic. Society would be forced to look at the problem
and seek solutions.
Although Professor Dwyer's suggestion sounds both intriguing and
offensive, in the final analysis, it may not represent much of a change in the
status quo. As seen in Bobbijean and V.R., although the biological mother has
a legal tie to the child upon birth, the child may be taken out of her custody
immediately after birth in certain situations. The difference between this
procedure and requiring that certain biological parents meet special criteria
before becoming the child's legal parent may not be all that significant. In
either case, the parent must meet certain conditions in order to regain custody
of their biological child. The burden is on the parent to demonstrate his or her
competence. The current system may take fifteen months or longer to free the
child from his biological parent so that he may be permanently placed in a
stable environment."? Professor Dwyer's suggested system may streamline
the process and thus lead to the permanent placement of children at earlier
intervals. This would be good for the child and good for society as it would
reduce the possibility that the child would be shuffled around in the foster care
system before finding a suitable home. However, if both systems result in a
long process for the child, there is not much need to change.
Finally, additional resources should be used to improve the foster care
system. Foster care children experience struggles that children raised in stable
homes with their own families do not experience. This seems to be an
440. The unwed fathers' cases give some support to such a system. The Court has held that a
biological connection does not automatically create a constitutionally protected right to a relationship with
a child. As the Court held in Lehr v. Robertson, 436 U.S. 248, a biological father has the potential to have
a constitutionally protected interest in a relationship with his child only if he takes steps to develop a
relationship in additional to the biological connection. Id. at 260. This is a concept that is more difficult
to apply to a mother because normally at birth the mother obtains a protected legal right to her biological
child even if she never develops a relationship with the child. The holding in Michael H. and Victoria D.
v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, suggests that even a preexisting relationship may not be enough to give the
unwed father a constitutionally protected right to a continuing relationship with his child. Taken together,
these cases may mean that Professor Dwyer's suggestion may be constitutionally permissible.
441. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, (Harvard University Press
2005). Professor Guggenheim suggests that our society would find repugnant a system that required that
those wanting to become parents obtain a state "parenting license" in order to be a parent and then parceled
out children to those licensed by some government arranged system, due to our notion of the natural right
to children. Id at 19. Our society is uncomfortable with government having the power to allocate children,
although this may be in the best interest of the children. Id. at 20.
442. Undercurrent law, the state must petition to terminate parental right is a child has been in foster
care for fifteen of the twenty-two most recent month absent special circumstances. See supra note 45 and
accompanying text.
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inescapable fact for most foster children.t" Foster care is necessary and we
should do all we can to make sure that it is a positive experience for the
children who must go through the system.
VII. CONCLUSION
Bobbijean and V.R. may be just the beginning of the use of "no more
kids" conditions in case plans developed to address child maltreatment. With
increased efforts to protect children and reduce government spending, there
are likely to be more courts who will attempt to impose such conditions,
unless steps are taken to prevent this result. Court efforts at forcing parents
with children already in the foster care system to not give birth to additional
children may be motivated by valid concerns, but may lead down a
treacherous path. The end of this path could easily lead to coerced
sterilization presented in the form of voluntary compliance with a court-
imposed case plan.t" Those likely to be subject to such coercion are those
who are unable to fight back. Imposition of the condition would be justified
as a means to protect parents from the consequences of their actions and to
protect their potential children from the danger of maltreatment. Imposition
of such a condition says to many foster care children that things would be
better if they had not been born at all even though many of these children
overcome their problems and go on to be productive members of society.
Because of the danger that imposition in one case would lead to
imposition in more and more cases, the condition should not be imposed even
if it is legally permissible.r" It is better to channel additional resources into
443. See Martha Shirk & Gary Stangler, supra note 403, and JENNIFER TOTH, ORPHANS OF THE
LIvING, (Simon & Shuster 1997) for stories of children who have lived in the foster care system. All had
troubles. Some were successful despite these troubles.
444. The reality of concerns about tacit coercion to be sterilized is illustrated by the actions taken by
a family court judge in Kentucky to deal with the problem of "dead beat" dads. Judge Michael Foellger,
a family court judge in Campbell County, Kentucky, considered implementing a payment plan for those
who "voluntarily" elected to have a vasectomy rather than face thirty days in jail. Judge Foellger reported
having already given some "dead beat" dads the option of thirty days in jailor a vasectomy. Six out of
seven selected the vasectomy. The payment plan would be a new step in Judge Foellger's efforts to deal
with dead beat dads. See Andrea w.Fancher, Thinking Outside the Box-A Constitutional Analysis ofthe
Option to Choose Between Jail and Procreation, 19 QUINNIPIAC PROB. LJ. 328 (2006) for a discussion
and analysis of Judge Foellger's unique approach to child support cases.
445. See Epps, supra note 414. This article discusses the use of this condition in probation cases
involving child abuse, which has generally not been allowed, and two cases involving failure to pay child
support in which the court allowed the condition to be imposed. [d. at 623-627. The article argues that
there are more effective ways to ensure that children are supported and to rehabilitate parents, as
demonstrated by the majority of cases involving child abuse. [d. at 653-660. The alternatives suggested
do not impinge on protected rights or place us on a slippery slope headed towards further restrictions on
procreation. [d. at 646-655. The dangers posed by the condition in probation cases are the same as those
2008] THE RIGHT RESPONSIBIliTY 133
foster care and other programs to make success a reality for all foster children.
Money should not be a concern when it comes to securing the future of the
most helpless, dependent members of our society--our children. Our
commitment to the next generation should inspire us to do at least that much.
posed by the condition imposed in a case plan. Neither therefore should be allowed.

